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Historians trac.l.tiona:ly have exaggerated Dwight
Morrow's role in the Mexican rtevol�c:.ion.

According to ':he

traditional view, Morrow arrived in Mexico as the new
U.S. ambassador in 1927 ar.d proceeded to convince President
Plutarco Elfas Calles that the ti�e had come to apply the
brakes to his revolutionary r.eforms.

In the next three

years, the vexatious oil dispute, the bloody Church-State
conf .!.ict, 3.:id the pre,blems �aused by t�e a3rarian ·reform
were, supposedly, settled, thanks to Morrow's benign,
business-like approach to diplomatic affairs.
But ther� are many �roblems with this interpreta
tion of U.S.-Mexican rel3.tions.

I� now appears that

changing political a?"ld ecor.omic conditi ons in che Un::.ted
States and Mexico had created an !deal environment for a
statesman Nith Morrow's special talents.

In the United

States, talk of armed inter,e::1tion in Hexico had brought
a storm of criticism from th� public, che press, and majcr
sec.:cr-s oi the Americ3.r. ;::iusiness cornmuni r..y.

th th only

the patroleura interests arid scattered cor.servative elements
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demanding a hard line, Washington realized that less
belligerent tactics were 11eeded to achieve its diplomatic
goals south of the Rio Grande.
In Mexico, President Calles welcomed Ambassador
Morrow because he r.ad always shared the former banker's
conservative economic ideas.

Only the State Department's

uncompromisi�g attitude and left-wing pressure had forced
Calles to appear far more radical than he truly was on
issues involving the oil industry, labor relations, and
the agrarian reform.

However, by late 1927 Calles finally

enjoyed 3ufficient political power to control his enemies
and deal with an American "mvoy .,.:r.o was willing to
cooperate witi che Mexicans, =ather than forcing them to
new extremes with unreasonable demancs.
:1orrow was, therefore, met with great fa!lfare in
Mexico and was im.�ediately encouraged to deal directly with
Calles on a persona: basis.

Exploiting the ambassador's

good will and evident respect for Mexican sovereignty,
Calles was soon able to retreat from certain troublesome
policies without losing face in the Unitee States or
Mexico.

As a result, the oil dispute was settled as Calles

submitted new o:�l legislation to his Congress and wrote
new !'egulations for the 1.ndust.:-y w1. th Morrow's as::;i.s tan-::::e.
The pr�sident was, moreover, able to control agrarian
forces with Mo:rrow 1 s aid as Calles' ag�ari�n officials
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discouraged the "reckless transfer of land" when they
accompanied the ambassador on his trips through-the
countryside.

Other American cases were quietly resolved

in Mexican courts and by an agrarian official who was
temporarily assigned to the Foreign Ministry.

Later, when

a total defeat of the Cristeros appeared impossible and
Morrow's own life was in danger, Calles exploited the envoy's
negotiating skills to settle the Church-State dispute and
remove yet another source of friction between the United
States and Mexico.
Morrow's cooperation and support were considered to
be of even greater irr,pcrtance at the height of two politi.cal
crises in 1928 and 1529.

In 1928, Alvaro Obregon's assassi

nation threatened to shake the ·foundations of Mexicar.
political and economic stability, but Morrow's publicly
expressed confidence in the government helped to prevent
both a business panic and a new military revolt in mid-1928.
In 1929, when a military revolt finally did break out, the
ambassador's support was considered essential in obtaining
Washington's aid and in defeating the rebels before their
movement could seriously affect Mexican political and
economic progress.
However, by 1930 several factors, including rumors
that Morrow had begun to profit f=om his diplomatic post,
had coir.bined to produce a "backfire of resentnent" against
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the now-famous arobassador.

Dwight Morrow can, nevertheless,

be considered a precursor to Franklin Roosevelt's Good
Neighbor policy because he ardently opposed U.S. military
intervention and economic imperialism in Latin America.
His mission can be judged a diplomatic success because,
while Morrow allowed Calles to exploit his good will during
serious political and economic crises, American foreign
policy goals were finally achieved with tactful and innova
tive methods for the first time in the Mexican Revolution.
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up trouble.''

Clearly irritated, the statesman declared

that "I certainly ought to have been kicked out of the
Cabinet if I had been fool enough to write those docu
ments.11 5 9
But President Coolidge appeared to be more
conciliatory.

The chief executive was encouraged by the

Mexican promise to protect American property and he was
certainly relieved to hear that Calles did not intend to
release his embarrassing evidence against the United States.
None of the three hundred and fifty confiscated documents
actually called for war, but they clearly revealed the
uncompromsing, racist, and bullying attitude of a great
many American dip1ornats in the United States and ·Mexico�
Perhaps most importantly, Coolidge realized that his govern
ment's position in Mexico had become indistinguishable
from the oil producers' belligerent stand against Calles.
The "higher authorities" who frustratedSinclair's negoti�tions
with Calles were, undoubtedly, members of the Oil Producers
Association, rather than officials of the State Department,
but the distinction between the two institutions and their
goals had obviously become blurred in the Mexican mind.
Calles and many others in Mexico believed that Sheffield,
Kellogg, and the U.S. Secretary of Treasury, Andrew W. Mellon,
were major stockholders and officers in the oil companies;
the Mexicans never doubted reports that Sheff ie.ld was to

